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It is not uncommon for firms to explore a new venture under the belief it will generate 
profits, only to find out later that although costs accumulated, profits did not materialize. To 
manage the high level of uncertainty involved in this process, new ventures are generally 
designed as vehicles of exploration (Wu, 2012) that allow for a staged investment of resources, 
starting with small initial investments that can be scaled up or discontinued as uncertainty is 
resolved over time (Folta, 1998; Li and Chi, 2013). As such, new ventures provide firms a 
vehicle by which they can probe an uncertain future (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) without fully 
committing early on to an irreversible course of action (Folta, Johnson, and O’Brien, 2006). Our 
focus in the present paper is on the timing of strategic decisions that firms make regarding their 
exploration ventures. Prior research in the fields of entrepreneurship, real options reasoning, and 
decision speed has demonstrated a link between the timing of making decisions and performance 
(Baum and Wally, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Judge and Miller, 1991). The antecedents to the 
timing of decisions, however, are less understood and pose an interesting dilemma. 
On the one hand, firms have an incentive to postpone. They may wish to wait and “keep 
their options open,” deferring irreversible decisions to later in time when more information is 
available and uncertainty is reduced (Dixit and Pindyck, 1995; Mitchell, 1989; McGrath and 
Nerkar, 2004). Apart from potentially increasing the probability that the “right” decision is made, 
waiting can serve to secure commitment from the firm’s key stakeholders, increase the 
legitimacy of the action eventually chosen, and avoid escalating commitment to action paths that 
are not fully considered (McDonald and Siegel, 1984; Perlow, Okhuysen, and Repenning, 2002). 
On the other hand, waiting can be costly. Strenuous competition and increasingly fast-paced 
environments dictate that those companies that act more quickly enjoy competitive advantages 
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Kownatzki et al., 2013). Indeed, recognition of the costs of 






1989) and first-mover advantages (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). There is evidence, 
therefore, that a firm’s incentives to make a decision more quickly sometimes outweigh those to 
delay. How these incentives vary constitutes an interesting theoretical and empirical question. 
TIMING TERMINATION AND EXPLOITATION 
 
 What factors are likely to influence the timing of strategic decisions in new ventures? In 
the sections that follow, we theorize on the interplay of the firm’s existing portfolio of ventures 
(McGrath, 1999) and prevailing market conditions (Bowman and Hurry, 1993) and how they 
influence the timing of new venture termination and exploitation. 
 
Owner’s Entrepreneurial Portfolio Composition 
 
Closely tied to the notion that organizations can make small initial investments in many 
new ventures simultaneously is the observation that organizations typically make venture 
decisions in the context of their business portfolio of other competing investments (McGrath, 
1999). As a result, portfolio-related factors are likely an important consideration in how options 
are managed (Li and Chi, 2013). We expect that in an owner’s portfolio, the share of ventures 
that are in the exploration stage will influence the timing of termination and exploitation.  
Because organizational decisions tend to be idiosyncratic (Cyert and March, 1963), 
termination and exploitation decisions depend on the subjective assessments of available 
alternatives. When an organization has relatively more exploration ventures, it has more 
alternatives from which to choose. However, because starting and maintaining exploration 
ventures is costly, maintaining many exploration ventures does not necessarily increase the 
portfolio’s value (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). In fact, key to using exploration ventures in 
managing uncertainty is to terminate less promising ventures and redeploy resources toward the 
exploitation of new ventures that show promise (McGrath, 1999). If an organization pursues a 
larger set of ventures, the range of expected venture outcomes that are deemed non-satisfactory 
may widen, and the probability of termination of those perceived as less promising should 
increase (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). Hence, we offer Hypothesis 1a as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: A larger share of exploration projects in the owner’s portfolio decreases 
the time to venture termination. 
 
Ceasing exploration by exploiting a venture is not merely the opposite of ceasing 
exploration by terminating a venture; these decisions are different. First, definitively sanctioning 
an exploration venture to go operational is typically an even more costly decision than 
termination. Particularly in resource-intensive industries like the mining or pharmaceutical 
industries, the exploitation decision involves massive investments. As a result, most companies 
can only successfully manage a limited number of exploitation ventures at any one time 
(Bowman and Hurry, 1993). Second, exploitation is a long-term investment that is not easily 
reversed. As a consequence, it is likely that organizations are hesitant to exploit any exploration 
venture if better alternatives exist in their portfolio (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). Therefore, 
when there are relatively more exploration ventures, organizations are more likely to be inclined 







Hypothesis 1b: A larger share of exploration projects in the owner’s portfolio increases 
the time to venture exploitation. 
Market Conditions: Uncertainty and Trajectory 
 
Organizations also make option decisions in response to market signals (Bowman and 
Hurry, 1993; Kogut, 1991). We build on the seminal works of Aldrich (1979), Dess and Beard 
(1984), and Boyd (1990) on organizational task environments to distinguish two relevant 
external market conditions—market uncertainty and market trajectory. 
 
Market Uncertainty.  
 
Following Hoskisson and Busenitz (2001), we focus on the degree of uncertainty about a 
given market’s future. When market conditions are more uncertain, organizations stand to gain 
more by holding on to their options and delaying irreversible actions (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; 
Li and Chi, 2013). Hence, we expect that when firms are experiencing higher levels of market 
uncertainty, they are less able to judge the value of each exploration venture in their portfolio. 
Hence firms will strive to keep exploring, thereby reducing potential losses by avoiding 
inadvertently exploiting or terminating the “wrong” venture. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Higher levels of market uncertainty increase the time to venture  
termination. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Higher levels of market uncertainty increase the time to venture  
exploitation. 
 
Market Trajectory.  
 
Whether a market trajectory is rising or falling provides an organizational decision maker 
with diverging incentives for the timing of option decisions (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). A 
positive market trajectory corresponds to a rising price, which indicates that the market for a 
given venture’s products is becoming increasingly more favorable. Thus, a positive market 
trajectory is likely to delay venture termination because delay provides sufficient time for the 
market potential to reach a level that makes the venture viable. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: A positive market trajectory increases the time to venture termination. 
 
Rising demand indicates a given venture has more promise. A consequence of this 
increasing promise is that it is more likely to attract competitors’ attention (McGrath and Nerkar, 
2004). The anticipation of an influx of competitors to a rising market in turn speeds the decision 
to begin exploitation (Mitchell, 1989). Therefore, a positive market trajectory indicates 
momentum—an opening window of opportunity—thereby, increasing the need for quick 












Our empirical study is based on an analysis of the timing of termination and exploitation 
decisions in a sample of 3,272 new exploration ventures started in the Australian mining industry 
over the years 2002–2011. The global mining industry is primarily concerned with three 
activities: the exploration of deposits of minerals and hydrocarbons (i.e., oil and gas), the 
extraction and trade of such resources, and the provision of a wide variety of services to firms 
engaged in these activities (Connor, 2010).  
We used the Register of Australian Mining, a comprehensive publicly available archive 
of reference books with annual data on all mining companies, deposits, and directors in the 
Australian mining industry, to construct our sample. Our second source of data was the Bureau 
of Resources and Energy Economics (BREE), which provides publicly available monthly price 
data on a wide variety of resources traded on the open market (e.g., gold, nickel, uranium, 
copper, coal, iron ore, etc.). 
 
Dependent Variable.  
 
Our dependent variable is the number of years it takes a new exploration venture to reach 
a termination or exploitation decision. The timing of termination was captured as the time from 
when the exploration venture began (as a prospect) to the time it was terminated. The timing of 
exploitation was captured as the time from when the exploration venture began (as a prospect) to 
the time it was exploited (i.e., advanced to the mine stage). Termination and exploitation are 
mutually exclusive decisions, and each exploration venture faces the “competing risk” at any 
point in time of either being terminated or exploited. The baseline against which the two 
decisions are compared is “delay”—an observation that does not experience an event during the 
period and thereby continues exploration (i.e., prospecting or studying).  
 
Independent Variables  
 
Owner’s Entrepreneurial Portfolio Composition.  
 
Owner’s entrepreneurial portfolio composition is a time-varying covariate that reflects 
the ratio of the total number of exploration ventures (i.e., prospects + advanced projects) to the 
total number of ventures (i.e., prospects + advanced projects + mines) in the owner’s portfolio 
per year. In cases for which an exploration venture has multiple owners (i.e., an alliance between 
mining companies), we used the mean portfolio composition across owners. 
 
Market Uncertainty.  
 
We used commodity price data to construct the measures for market conditions—






with which the venture was associated (e.g., gold, copper, etc.) and its years of operation. Market 
uncertainty is a time-varying covariate that captures the variability in the commodity price trend 
(i.e., amplitude around trend) in the preceding 12 months for the commodity the focal 
exploration venture. We assume greater variability make decision makers perceive more 
uncertainty. The measure is based on Dess and Beard’s (1984) and Boyd’s (1990) measure of 
dynamism.  
 
Market Trajectory.  
 
Market trajectory captures the commodity price trend (up or down) over the preceding 12 
months for each venture per year. This measure is based on Dess and Beard’s (1984) and Boyd’s 
(1990) measurement of “munificence” and concerns the coefficient (beta) of a regression of time 
against the commodity price divided by the mean of the commodity price over the same time 
period.  
 
 Control Variables.  
 
In our statistical model, we control for financial capital, venture size, portfolio size, 
product scope, unique skills, and age. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
We performed Cox competing risks regressions of the timing of termination and 
exploitation decisions in new ventures. Full data were obtained for a total of 3,272 new 
exploration ventures, comprising 6,655 venture-year observations.  
Through our hypothesis tests we find general support for a framework proposing that the 
timing of decisions regarding new ventures is a result of competing tensions for acceleration and 
deceleration, the tradeoff between which is resolved in situ based on the specific state of both the 
owner’s project portfolio and the market in which a new venture is embedded. More specifically, 
our findings demonstrate that the proportion of exploratory ventures in an organization’s 
portfolio is an important driver of the timing of strategic decisions, but only with regard to 
venture exploitation. We also found that the environment has a strong main effect on decision 
timing. Market uncertainty increases the time to venture termination (but not exploitation), and a 
positive market trajectory increases the time to venture termination yet decreases the time to 
venture exploitation.  
Taken together, these findings spawn a web of relationships that jointly increase our 
understanding of the complex tradeoffs between acceleration and deceleration in the timing of 
strategic decisions and highlights the importance of distinguishing between the timing of 
termination and exploitation decisions. More specifically, this study has the following theoretical 
implications. 
First, regarding the trade-off between acceleration and deceleration in the timing of 
strategic decisions, our results indicate that decision makers resolve the tradeoff between these 
competing incentives in response to two important factors: the alternative investments available 






implications. First, incentives for delay and speed are not universal but are instead firm and 
market specific. This adds to our understanding of the strategic nuances of enacting real options 
reasoning and the notion of “fit.” That is, to understand the “why” behind the timing of actions 
that are critical to real options reasoning, we must consider the “who” (i.e., the composition of 
the owner’s portfolio) and the “when” (based on the nature of the market).  
Second, when we assume firms act in their own best interest, the benefits of speed (e.g., Baum 
and Wally, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989) appear to be relevant to only certain types of decisions and 
certain types of situations. More specifically, it is important to distinguish between the timing of 
two distinct decisions—termination and exploitation—which provides an opportunity to partially 
reconcile the debate between the need for speed (Baum and Wally, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989) and 
the need for delay to reduce uncertainty (McGrath, 1999). Therefore, when considering the 
notion of speed, our findings suggest it is important to be specific about what type of speed—
speed of termination and/or speed of exploitation—because these two types of strategic decisions 
speed do not necessarily go hand in hand. We also found that not distinguishing these different 
types of decisions (as in our pooled model) severely obfuscates the findings. Given this deeper 
understanding of the timing of exploitation, future research can explore how termination and/or 
exploitation can be sped up or, in some circumstances, slowed down. For example, how can 
exploration be organized in a way that unpromising new ventures are terminated quickly yet 
those new ventures that show some promise are not exploited too quickly (i.e., exploitation is 
delayed to enable further exploration)? Similarly, research can explore how to organize the 
delayed termination of what appear to be “marginal” new ventures while still rapidly exploiting 
those new ventures that show promise. 
A second theoretical implication of our study pertains to the rapidly growing literature on 
“entrepreneurial opportunities” (see Short, Ketchen, Shook, and Ireland, 2010, for a review). 
While we did not choose this as the main framing of our study, our research makes contributions 
to that stream of research. If we regard portfolio composition as an actor characteristic (reflecting 
strategy) and market conditions as attributes of the opportunity, our work adds to the very small 
number of studies (Barreto, 2012; Bradley, McMullen, Artz, and Simiyu, 2012; Dencker, 
Gruber, and Shah, 2009) that directly theorize and test Shane and Venkataraman’s (2000) nexus 
idea by including effects of the actor, the opportunity, and their interaction in research using 
observational data. In particular, we research an empirical context that, like Barreto (2012), 
makes it possible to come close to capturing the notion of “objective opportunity” as originally 
conceived by Shane and Venkataraman (2000; cf. Shane, 2012).  
Our study also contributes to an emerging sub-stream of research that—unlike most 
research on entrepreneurial opportunities—considers the fact that actors commonly consider not 
one but a set of several opportunities or new venture ideas at any given time (e.g., Gruber, 
MacMillan, and Thompson, 2008, 2013; Hill and Birkinshaw, 2010; cf. Penrose, 1959). All of 
our theorized predictors (and some of our control variables) can be regarded as contributing to 
this perspective as well. Our two market-based opportunity characteristics go beyond these 
previous studies. In addition, Hill and Birkinshaw (2010) outlined volume and stage of 
development as important dimensions in assessing “idea sets”. Our notion of portfolio 
composition combines these dimensions by focusing on the relative share of early-stage (i.e., 






operationalization issues, or focused on antecedents of the idea/opportunity composition, we 
theorized and tested their effects. 
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